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This article explores the implications of the Constitution for the development of the
common law of servitude. Following from an analysis of two recent servitude cases in which
the courts might have developed the law of servitude for doctrinal or policy reasons (the
court controversially decided in both cases that development was unnecessary because the
desired result could be reached on the basis of the law as it stands), it will be argued that the
question whether the common law should apply to a particular dispute at all and whether
it should be developed (because its outcome is for some reason unacceptable) are
constitutional issues and not purely common-law ones. Both questions have to be
answered in view of fundamental constitutional principles such as the supremacy of the
Constitution, the single-system-of-law principle enunciated by the Constitutional Court,
and the subsidiarity principles developed by that court. Having argued that this holds even
in instances where no legislation applies to the dispute, the article distinguishes between
situations where the decision to develop the common law follows from direct constitutional
obligations and situations where that decision is taken purely on policy or doctrinal
grounds. The final section of the article identifies section 25 issues possibly resulting from a
decision to develop the common law of servitude and indicates how those issues can be
approached in view of the FNB methodology for the analysis of section 25 disputes.
I INTRODUCTION
In this article I consider the approach and methodology involved in develop-
ing the common law of servitude in the post-1994 constitutional context.
I am particularly interested in the impression that was created in recent
decisions (and academic literature) that the servitude issues that arise in case
* This article is an extended version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of
the SouthAfrican Property Law Teachers, University of Cape Town, 1–2 November
2012. The article is based on part of the ﬁrst draft of chapters of A J van der Walt The
Law of Servitudes (Juta Law, forthcoming in 2014 as part of the series Juta’s Property Law
Library) and in part embodies a further development of the ideas set out in ch 2 para
3.6 of A J van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 81–91. The article should be
read together with A J van der Walt ‘The continued relevance of servitude’ (2013) 3
Property Law Review 3, in which I work out the normative framework within which
my ideas about development of the common law should be seen. Thanks to Dr
Reghard Brits and Ms Lizette Grobler of the South African Research Chair in
Property Law for research assistance and to participants in the SAPLT meeting for
stimulating questions. Prof Susan Scott (Unisa) asked the fundamental question: ‘But
how will it work?’ Thanks also to Gustav Muller and Sue-Mari Maass for comments
on the ﬁrst draft.
† B Iur et Art Hons (BA) LLB (Potchefstroom) LLM (Witwatersrand) LLD
(Potchefstroom).
‡ The South African Research Chair in Property Law is funded by the Depart-
ment of Science and Technology, administered by the National Research Founda-
tion and hosted by Stellenbosch University.
722
law can and should be solved by ‘normal’ judicial development of the
common law and that such development is largely associated with what is
perceived as the inherent logic of the common law, supported by what is
described as ‘proper’ historical and comparative research. I am also interested
in remarks, primarily emanating from academic comments on case law, that
development of the common law must sometimes take place under the
guidance of the Constitution to ensure a fair outcome in individual cases.
The relationship between constitutional analysis and development of the
common law has been a source of debate and controversy ever since the
advent of the new constitutional dispensation in 1994. The provision in
s 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 that ‘when
developing the common law . . ., every court . . . must promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ added fuel to the ﬁre of this debate
and, far from bringing clarity and unanimity, stirred up further controversy
about the role of the Constitution and of the courts in the development of
the common law.1
Normally, the development of servitude law is not considered a major
source of controversy, even when it is conceded that development of the
common law must generally take place in the shadow of the Constitution.
Many property lawyers and even constitutional lawyers may therefore have
some difﬁculty in imagining how and why servitude law should attract
constitutional analysis at all. Servitude law, some or perhaps most property
lawyers would argue, is one of the areas where the common law can simply
develop according to the traditional logic of private-law doctrine, without
any signiﬁcant input from constitutional law. In fact, an overview of recent
literature suggests that servitude law does not enjoy all that much attention
even from property scholars, let alone constitutional law scholars. The only
South African book entirely dedicated to servitudes has not been updated
since 1973.2 Of the two major general academic texts on modern South
1 In reaction to the Constitutional Court’s proposition that the courts must
develop the common law whenever it deviates from the spirit, purport and objects of
the Bill of Rights, Anton Fagan ‘The secondary role of the spirit, purport and objects
of the Bill of Rights in the common law’s development’ (2010) 127 SALJ 611
proposed that the role of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in the
development of the common law is merely secondary. He describes the role of the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in the development of the common
law as that of a tiebreaker, a means of ‘choosing between ways of developing the
common law that are already justiﬁed by reasons that have nothing to do with the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ For criticism of Fagan’s argument see
A J van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) ch 2; Dennis Davis ‘How many
positivist legal philosophers can be made to dance on the head of a pin? A reply to
Professor Fagan’ (2012) 129 SALJ 59. For further exchanges between Fagan and
Davis seeAnton Fagan ‘A straw man, three red herrings, and a closet rule-worshipper
— A rejoinder to Davis JP’ (2012) 129 SALJ 788; Dennis Davis ‘The importance of
reading—Arebutter to the jurisprudence ofAnton Fagan’ (2013) 130 SALJ 52.
2 C G Hall & EAKellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973). The closest contender, C G van
der Merwe & M J de Waal The Law of Servitudes (1993), originally published as
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African property law, Van der Merwe Sakereg3 has the longer and more
detailed chapter on servitudes, but the latest edition predates the new
constitutional dispensation. Consequently, neither Hall & Kellaway nor Van
der Merwe pays any attention to the post-1994 obligation to consider the
place and role of all law in a single legal system dominated by the Constitu-
tion.4 The 2006 edition of Silberberg & Schoeman5 does consider the effect of
the Constitution on property law in general,6 but its analysis of servitude law
is less extensive than that of Van der Merwe, and its constitutional analysis
does not extend to the section on servitude law. The relatively small number
of academic journal articles and notes on servitudes published since 20067
also suggests that the law of servitudes is not high on the academic research
agenda, and more particularly that the new constitutional dispensation has
little or no signiﬁcance in servitude law.8
C G van der Merwe & M J de Waal ‘Servitudes’ in W A Joubert (ed) The Law of
South Africa vol 24 (1993) (now C G van der Merwe & M J de Waal ‘Servitudes’ in
W A Joubert (founding ed) & J A Faris (planning ed) The Law of South Africa vol 24 2
ed, updated by CG van der Merwe (2010)), was republished as the second part
(comprising 27 pages) of C G van der Merwe & M J de Waal The Law of Things and
Servitudes (1993).
3 C G van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) ch 11 (93 pages, excluding mineral
rights).
4 See s 2 of the Constitution (‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed
by it must be fulﬁlled.’); Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44
(‘There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the
supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force from the
Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.’); and compareA J van der Walt
Property and Constitution op cit note 1 ch 2. I return to this point below.
5 P J Badenhorst, J M Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of
Property 5 ed (2006) ch 14 (21 pages, excluding restrictive conditions and mineral and
petroleum resources). Interestingly, less than 20 per cent of the short chapter on
servitudes is dedicated to post-1989 case law.
6 Ibid ch 21, especially 579–83.
7 2006 is a more or less random date for the start of such an overview, but it is
roughly ten years since the Final Constitution came into operation. It is also the date
when the most recent edition of an important academic text on property law was
published (Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert ibid), which would in principle provide
the most recent academic overview of case law; and it is also the date on which the
electronic series Juta’s Quarterly Review, which would in principle reﬂect the case law
since 2006, was ﬁrst published.
8 The major domestic law journals published just ﬁve dedicated, full-length
articles on servitude law since 2006: J C Sonnekus ‘Erfdiensbaarhede en die
uitoefening daarvan civilier modo’ (2007) 70 THRHR 351; J A Lovett ‘Creating and
controlling private land use restrictions in Scotland and Louisiana: A comparative
mixed jurisdiction analysis’ (2008) 19 Stellenbosch LR 231; J L Neels ‘Ewigdurende
oorsaak. Die perpetua causa-vereiste by erfdiensbaarhede: Uitoefening van ’n saaklike
serwituut afhanklik van ’n positiewe dadigheid deur die eienaar of gebruiker van die
dienende erf’ 2009 TSAR 660; J L Neels ‘Ewigdurende oorsaak. Die perpetua
causa-vereiste by erfdiensbaarhede: Behoefte van die heersende erf en geskiktheid van
die dienende erf (deel 1)’ 2010 TSAR 73; J L Neels ‘Ewigdurende oorsaak. Die
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A fair number of cases on servitudes have been reported since 2006, some
dealing with issues that are established in doctrine but not often encountered
in the law reports, such as the acquisition of a servitude through prescription9
and the right of way of necessity.10 Two interesting recent decisions dealt
with novel questions that required the respective courts to consider judicial
development of the common law.11 In Linvestment the question was whether
a speciﬁed servitude of right of way can be relocated without the co-
operation of the owner of the dominant tenement.12 In Kidson the question
was whether the demolition of the speciﬁed building results in the termina-
tion of a servitude of habitatio.13 However, even these decisions attracted
relatively little academic attention, considering the novelty of the issues and
the fact that both at least arguably involved new developments of the
common law.14 As appears from the analysis below, most commentators
perpetua causa-vereiste by erfdiensbaarhede: Behoefte van die heersende erf en
geskiktheid van die dienende erf (deel 2)’ 2010 TSAR 331; J C Sonnekus ‘Verryking
van die eienaar by nie-uitoefening van habitatio en versorgingsverpligtinge jeens eie
ouer as bewoningsreghebbende’ (2010) 21 Stellenbosch LR 26. The 2007 Sonnekus
article was inspired by case law (Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007
(2) SA363 (SCS); Roeloffze NO v Bothma NO 2007 (2) SA257 (C)). Apart from these
articles, a number of shorter notes and case notes directly comment on case law:
J C Sonnekus ‘Mandament van spolie en ongeregistreerde serwitute vir water’ 2006
TSAR 392 (Le Riche v PSP Properties CC 2005 (3) SA 189 (C)); J C Sonnekus
‘Persoonlike diensbaarhede en die herregistrasie van ’n gederegistreerde maatskappy
as reghebbende op gespanne voet’ 2008 TSAR 130 (Insamcor (Pty) Ltd v Dorbyl Light
& General Engineering (Pty) Ltd; Dorbyl Light & Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Insamcor (Pty) Ltd
2007 (4) SA 467 (SCA)); J C Sonnekus ‘Bewoningsreg (habitatio) — Verval dit weens
versteuring (vernietiging) van die bouwerk?’ 2009 TSAR 450; C G van der Merwe
‘Extinction of personal servitude of habitatio’ (2010) 73 THRHR 657; J Scott ‘Effect
of the destruction of a dwelling on the personal servitude of habitatio’ (2011) 74
THRHR 155 (all on Kidson v Jimspeed Enterprises CC 2009 (5) SA246 (GNP)).
9 Joles Eiendom (Pty) Ltd v Kruger & another 2007 (5) SA 222 (C); Kruger v Joles
Eiendom (Pty) Ltd & another 2009 (3) SA 5 (SCA); Buckland v Manga [2008] 2 All SA
177 (E); Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 (2) SA325 (SCA).
10 English v C J M Harmse Investments CC 2007 (3) SA 415 (N); Aventura Ltd v
Jackson NO 2007 (5) SA497 (SCA).
11 As appears from the analysis below, one of the issues in the literature is whether
the decisions actually developed the common law or not. However, it seems fair to
conclude that both decisions at least required the courts to consider whether
development was necessary.
12 Linvestment CC v Hammersley 2008 (3) SA283 (SCA).
13 Kidson v Jimspeed Enterprises CC 2009 (5) SA 246 (GNP). Van Rensburg & another
v Koekemoer & another 2011 (1) SA 118 (GSJ) also dealt with habitatio. In Beetge v
Bruwer [2009] ZAGPPHC 65, habitatio featured tangentially because the alleged
right had not been registered and therefore a limited real right that was binding on
third parties was never established. The respondent argued that the applicant (a
purchaser of the land) was bound by the personal right created between himself and
the previous owner by the doctrine of notice, but the court decided on the facts that
there was no indication that the new owner was or should have been aware of the
previous agreement.
14 The notable exception is the decision in Kidson ibid, which attracted three fairly
extensive (and in part disagreeing) case notes: Sonnekus 2009 TSAR op cit note 8;
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agree that the results reached in the two decisions are welcome and justiﬁed,
albeit that they disagree about the questions whether these results indeed
involved development of the common law and, if it did, about the correct
explanation of and justiﬁcation for the developments. Both decisions and the
majority of academic comments create the impression that the novel issues
arising from these and other cases can and should be solved by way of
‘normal’ judicial development of the common law, based on ‘proper’
historical analysis. A few brief remarks in academic comments on the Kidson
decision15 suggest that the decision could have constitutional implications,
but neither the courts deciding these two cases nor the academics comment-
ing on them indulged in full-scale constitutional analysis.
In part II of this article I ﬁrst discuss the two decisions in Kidson v Jimspeed
Enterprises CC16 and Linvestment CC v Hammersley,17 together with academic
comments, to show that an appeal to ‘proper’ analysis of historical authority is
insufﬁcient, at least in these two cases, to justify the kind of development of
the common law that the respective cases arguably required. Thereafter, in
part III of the article I consider the role of constitutional analysis in cases
involving or requiring development of the common law. In part IV of the
article I consider what a full-scale constitutional argument in support of the
results in Kidson and Linvestment might look like.
II DEVELOPMENT ON THE BASIS OF HISTORICAL
AUTHORITY
(a) The Kidson decision: Introduction
In Kidson v Jimspeed Enterprises CC18 the Gauteng North High Court had
to decide whether destruction of the building previously inhabited by the
beneﬁciary would terminate a servitude of habitatio. The Kidsons sold their
farm to Jimspeed but reserved and registered a lifelong right of habitation in
favour of Mr Kidson, relating to a home on the farm where they both lived.
While the farm was owned by Jimspeed the Kidsons left the home, appar-
ently because of conﬂict between them and Jimspeed, and thereafter Jim-
speed demolished the house. The farm was subsequently sold and at the time
of the judgment it was owned by a family trust, which acquired the property
uninhabited by the applicants and without the building, but with the
servitude still registered against the title deed. Because of personal circum-
stances the Kidsons wanted to return to the house on the farm, but apart from
the fact that the house had been demolished, the current owner denied any
Van der Merwe 2010 THRHR op cit note 8; Scott op cit note 8. I discuss the decision
and the comments extensively below.
15 Supra note 13.
16 Ibid.
17 Supra note 12.
18 Supra note 13.
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knowledge of the right of habitation and refused them access to the land. The
Kidsons, who were pensioners and could not afford other accommodation,
sought an order declaring that their right to live on the farm still existed as it
was registered against the title deed. The current owner argued that the right
of habitation had been terminated, either when the Kidsons left the farm or
when Jimspeed demolished the house.
The court decided on the facts that the servitude had neither lapsed as a
consequence of prescription,19 nor was it cancelled by notarial deed20 or
terminated by non-use.21 The court further decided, on its view of the
historical authorities, that the object of a servitude of habitation is the servient
land and not the building, and that destruction of the building would
therefore not terminate the servitude unless rebuilding had become impossi-
ble.22 For the servitude to lapse the land must be incapable of serving the
holder’s right; demolition of the building is insufﬁcient.23 The core ﬁnding
was therefore that the servitude in this case had not been terminated at any
point, that it still existed,24 and the Kidsons were entitled to rebuild the
house. They could not force the new landowner to rebuild or repair the
house,25 but if they restored the building they could occupy it according to
the original provisions of the servitude. If they were unwilling or unable to
restore the house exactly as it was prior to its demolition, they were entitled
to build an alternative structure on the place where the previous structure
had stood.26 The court also decided, more controversially, that the Kidsons
were entitled to use the land around the house for a personal orchard or
garden.27
19 Because the requirements of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 had not been
fulﬁlled: Kidson ibid para 5.
20 As provided for in s 68(1) or (2) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937: see
Kidson ibid para 5.
21 Ibid para 5, citing Voet 7.8.8: ‘[M]ere non-user of the right of dwelling does not
automatically lead to the disappearance or lapse of the right.’
22 Ibid paras 8 and 10, citing Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2.37.5, 2.39.14. The
court noted that Van derMerwe Sakereg op cit note 3 at 535 differs on this point.
23 Ibid para 10.
24 Ibid.
25 Placing such a burden on the owner of the servient tenement would be in
conﬂict with the general principles of servitude, particularly the passivity principle,
according to which the owner of the servient land cannot be forced to perform any
positive act. See egVan derMerwe Sakereg op cit note 3 at 471.
26 The new structure need not be immovable; it could for example be a caravan
home. However, if statutes or regulations are applicable to structures on that land
(presumably whether movable or immovable), the Kidsons would have to abide by
them. If they build an immovable structure, it becomes the property of the current
landowner, subject to the right of habitatio: see Kidson supra note 13 para 15, item 5.
27 Van der Merwe 2010 THRHR op cit note 8 and Scott op cit note 8 point out
that this aspect of the decision confuses habitatio with usus, which is a different kind
of personal servitude altogether.
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In view of the facts the court considered this outcome fair and equitable to
both the landowner28 and the Kidsons. Moreover, the court obviously
thought that the basis for this fair and equitable outcome was established
historical authority, without any need for development of the common law.
The Constitution is never mentioned as a source of authority or inspiration
for the decision.
The decision evoked comments from three senior academic commenta-
tors, all of whom are widely respected for their knowledge of servitude law
and for their ability to engage with the Roman-Dutch authorities.29
Although the three academics disagree on some of the detail, they agree on
the basic principles of habitatio as set out by the court. The most important
points of disagreement are whether the object of a servitude of habitation is
the land or the building identiﬁed for inhabitation and whether the servitude
is automatically and irreversibly terminated by law when the building is
destroyed. Interestingly, all three commentators are more or less sympathetic
to the idea that the Kidsons should have been helped in this case, although
they disagree on the correct way to reach that outcome. As appears from the
analysis below, the disagreements are largely inspired by conﬂicting
approaches to and reading of the relevant historical sources. Just two of the
commentators mention the Constitution in their analyses, but neither of
them provides a full constitutional analysis to justify the outcome.
(b) Academic comments on the Kidson decision
(i) J C Sonnekus
Sonnekus agrees with the court that the object of the right of habitation is not
the building but the servient land30 and that destruction of the structure
therefore does not terminate the right;31 accordingly, survival of the servitude
depends on the beneﬁciary’s ability to rebuild.32 He approves of the out-
come: the current landowner cannot be held responsible for rebuilding the
structure, but he must allow the applicants to rebuild whatever structure
would allow them reasonably to exercise their still existing right of habita-
tion.33 Importantly, Sonnekus agrees with the court that this outcome can be
reached on the basis of the common law as the court read it; development of
the common law is not required. Interestingly, he adds in passing that the
outcome is also in line with the obligations imposed by s 25 (property) and
28 In Kidson supra note 13 paras 11 and 12 the court states that it would be
‘inequitable’ for the landowner to receive the beneﬁt of the servitude being
terminated purely because the building was destroyed, whether by his own actions or
by a natural disaster such as a ﬁre, without indicating whether this beneﬁt would be
inequitable on private-law or on constitutional grounds. I return to this point below.
29 Sonnekus 2009 TSAR op cit note 8; Van der Merwe 2010 THRHR op cit note
8; Scott 2011 THRHR op cit note 8.
30 Sonnekus 2009 TSAR op cit note 8 at 454–5.
31 Ibid at 457.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid at 465.
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s 26 (access to housing) of the Constitution, but he does not expand upon this
point or engage in a full-scale constitutional analysis of either ss 25 or 26 to
support it.34
(ii) C G van der Merwe
C G van der Merwe is also satisﬁed with the outcome, but he disagrees in part
with the court’s line of argument.35 Like Sonnekus, he agrees with the court
that there was insufﬁcient evidence to support a ﬁnding that the servitude
had been lost through non-use or prescription, adding that the separate
question whether a servitude could be lost through implied abandonment,
apart from prescription, was not raised and therefore not decided in this
case.36 In the face of evidence to the effect that the Kidsons had been forced
from the farm and that they never acquiesced in the destruction of the house,
he argues that cancellation of the servitude by notarial deed would be
required to support a ﬁnding that the servitude had been abandoned.37 On
this point he therefore agrees with the decision, albeit on more speciﬁc
grounds that had not been articulated in the same detail by the court.
However, as far as destruction of the building is concerned, Van der
Merwe38 disagrees with the court’s conclusion (and thus also with Sonnekus
and with Scott) that the object of the servitude is the land and not the
building.39 In his (on this point sole dissenting) view, exactly the opposite
conclusion ﬁnds support in the relevant Roman law texts: the building is the
object of the right, provided that the building or space that is speciﬁed for
the right of habitation is indicated in the servitude-creating agreement by
clear and precise cadastral speciﬁcation.40 According to Van der Merwe, this
conclusion is also supported by the decision in Kain v Khan41 and in deeds
registry practice.42 Van der Merwe’s view, based on his reading of the relevant
Roman-Dutch sources (predominantly Grotius and Van der Keessel)43 is
therefore that when the servitude is one of habitation and if the object of the
servitude (a building or even part of a building) is precisely deﬁned or
34 Ibid at 464–5.
35 Van derMerwe 2010 THRHR op cit note 8.
36 Van der Merwe ibid at 658 points out that the rules for extinction of praedial
servitudes, including abandonment, also apply to personal servitudes such as habitatio
in so far as they are compatible.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid at 659–62.
39 Van der Merwe supports the court’s rejection of the decision in Salmon v Lamb’s
Executor and Naidoo 1906 EDC 351 as it is inapplicable to the facts in Kidson supra note
13; see ibid at 658–9.
40 The relevant texts are D 7.4.5.2; D 7.4.10.1: seeVan derMerwe ibid at 661–2.
41 1986 (4) SA251 (C): seeVan derMerwe ibid at 659–60.
42 Ibid.
43 The general principle set out by Grotius Inleiding 2.37.5, Van der Keessel
Praelectiones 2.37.5 and Voet 7.4.8 is that a servitude lapses if either the dominant or
servient land is destroyed: seeVan derMerwe ibid at 660.
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described in the servitude grant, the destruction of that object results in
termination of the servitude.
However, Van der Merwe agrees with the court (and with the other
commentators) that this conclusion on the basis of the Roman-Dutch
authorities would sometimes (including the Kidson case) result in unjustiﬁ-
ably harsh and unfair outcomes. He therefore argues, from a normative point
of view, that a servitude of habitation should not be terminated by accidental
or malicious destruction of the building. He agrees that an equitable outcome
would be to allow the Kidsons to rebuild the house and continue (or resume)
living there. However, unlike the court and Sonnekus, Van der Merwe
thinks that the common law does not allow for such an outcome and
therefore it needs to be developed. To make an equitable result possible, Van
der Merwe relies on an exception to the general Roman-Dutch principle
that destruction of a clearly identiﬁed structure terminates the servitude.
According to this exception in the local law of Haarlem,44 a servitude of
habitation revived automatically if the building was rebuilt. The Haarlem
exception existed in local customary law (as opposed to the Roman-based
law of the province of Holland) and applied to urban servitudes only, but Van
der Merwe argues that it could be the basis for development of a general
fairness exception for all servitudes of habitation in modern South African
law.45
(iii) J Scott
Scott agrees with the court and Sonnekus (and disagrees with Van der
Merwe) that the object of the servitude of habitatio is the land and not the
building, even when the building to which the servitude pertains is clearly
identiﬁed.46 However, he points out (with Van der Merwe and against
Sonnekus) that the Van der Keessel texts cited by the court, as well as other
authorities,47 support the conclusion that the servitude is terminated when
the structure is destroyed. In his view, the real issue in Roman-Dutch law,
namely whether the servitude would revive when the building is rebuilt, was
not decided in Kidson because the court proceeded on the assumption that
the servitude was never terminated.48 Scott therefore concludes that as the
common law stands, the servitude was terminated by demolition of the
building. An equitable solution that might allow for continued existence of
the right of habitation would require development of the common law.
44 The exception is discussed by Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2.39.14: see Van der
Merwe ibid.
45 Van der Merwe ibid at 665 makes clear that he regards this as an equitable
exception that should apply, in addition to urban land, to all habitation servitudes.
46 Scott op cit note 8 at 160.
47 Scott ibid at 162 argues that Voet 7.4.10, Van der Keesel Praelectiones 2.39.14,
Huber Hedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 2.40.14 and especially Grotius Inleiding 2.39.14 all
point strongly towards the conclusion that destruction of the building must inevitably
terminate a servitude of habitation.
48 Ibid at 163.
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Scott does not disagree with the court and the other commentators on the
need for an equitable solution, but he does not think that the common law as
it stands allows for continued exercise of the servitude. He also rejects Van der
Merwe’s proposal that the unfair results of the general rule could be rectiﬁed
with recognition of a fairness exception based on the local law of Haarlem,
because the exception referred to in the law of Haarlem was local law that
does not form part of the sources of SouthAfrican law.49 Scott points out that
an equitable solution might in fact have been available in terms of the
common law, namely that the servitude was terminated by demolition of the
building but might revive upon rebuilding, but the court precluded reliance
upon this common law solution because it refused to accept that the
servitude had indeed been terminated.50 In fact, the court preferred, in what
Scott describes as a ‘conscience-soothing . . . ‘‘fuzzy’’ kind of way’, to help
the applicants by ﬁnding, in conﬂict with the Roman-Dutch authorities, that
the servitude was never terminated. This, Scott argues, is the heart of the
matter. If the Roman-Dutch authorities point to a result that we ﬁnd
unacceptable on fairness grounds, the solution is not to ﬁnd an equitable
result that soothes our conscience but relies on fuzzy reasoning, but to
determine whether the principles of Roman-Dutch law can be developed so
as to ﬁnd an equitable result in accordance with the Constitution. The
decision in Kidson was probably an effort to develop the common law in
accordance with s 39(2) and s 173 of the Constitution, especially in view
of the housing right in s 26,51 but in Scott’s opinion this development of
the common-law needs to take place on the basis of a proper reading of the
common-law authorities.52 Scott does not engage in a full-scale constitu-
tional analysis to show how this kind of development could be done, but he
refers to the Linvestment decision53 as an example of how properly justiﬁed
development of the common law could proceed. The Linvestment court
rejected the unfair outcome that rigid application of the common-law
principles would have in that case; in Scott’s view development of the
common law always has to start with a proper reading of the common-law
authorities, followed by the conclusion that rigid application of the applica-
ble principle would lead to an unfair result and rejection of the principle.
49 Ibid at 161, citing Discount Bank v Dawes (1829) 1 Menz 38; Salmon v Lamb’s
Executor and Naidoo supra note 39 at 371. Scott (at 161) refers to Van der Merwe’s
view (in 2010 THRHR op cit note 8 at 665) and points out that Van der Merwe does
not consider the authority of the source uponwhich he relies.
50 Scott ibid at 163.
51 Ibid at 168. Scott does not explain why the court might have considered it
necessary to develop the common law in view of constitutional requirements at all,
seeing that the court concluded that the common law (in the court’s reading) already
provides for an acceptable outcome.
52 Ibid at 164.
53 Linvestment CC v Hammersley supra note 12. For a full discussion of this decision
and the issues surrounding it see Leigh-AnnKiewitz Relocation of a Specified Servitude of
Right of Way (unpublished LLM thesis, StellenboschUniversity, 2010).
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(iv) Conclusions
None of the three academic commentators is unhappy with the result in the
Kidson decision, but they raise at least three justiﬁcations for this outcome.
Like the court, Sonnekus proposes a reading of the authorities that would
imply that the servitude was never terminated and that the beneﬁciaries
could rebuild the structure. According to this approach development of the
common law was not required because a fair outcome was possible on the
basis of the common law principles. Van der Merwe and Scott read the
authorities differently and conclude (albeit for different reasons) that a
servitude of habitation is in fact terminated when the structure is demolished.
On the basis of this conclusion, both propose a development of the common
law that would justify the equitable outcome in this case. Van der Merwe
argues in favour of an equitable development of the common law in the form
of an exception in local law, while Scott argues that an equitable develop-
ment is possible in view of other common-law authorities (not considered by
the court) to the effect that rebuilding of the structure revives the servitude.
For purposes of the rest of my argument in this article I assume, for the sake
of argument, that Scott is correct as far as the Roman-Dutch authorities are
concerned; that a servitude of habitation is indeed terminated when the
relevant structure is destroyed; and that the common law does not provide
any alternative solution for hard cases. With Scott and Van der Merwe I
therefore assume that an equitable outcome in the Kidson case requires
development of the common law. In the rest of this section I investigate
Scott’s suggestion that the Linvestment decision might provide an example of
the correct approach according to which the common law can be developed,
on the basis of proper analysis of the historical authorities, to allow for
equitable outcomes in cases where inﬂexible application of the common law
leads to unfair results.
(c) The Linvestment decision
In Linvestment CC v Hammersley54 the Supreme Court of Appeal had to
decide whether to abandon the common-law principle, established in 1920
in Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis,55 that a speciﬁed servitude of right of way can
only be relocated on the basis of mutual consent between the dominant and
servient owners. Voet,56 the most cited Roman-Dutch authority on this
point, states that if the chosen route for a general praedial servitude is or
becomes burdensome for the servient owner, the servient owner can suggest
an alternative route that is equally convenient for the dominant tenement,
but does not indicate whether this also applies in the case of speciﬁed
servitudes. In Gardens Estate, the Appellate Division held that a speciﬁed
servitude can only be relocated by mutual consent and that the possibility for
54 Supra note 12. For my discussion of this decision and the issues surrounding it I
rely quite extensively on Kiewitz ibid.
55 1920AD 144 at 150.
56 Voet 8.3.8.
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relocation mentioned by Voet applies only to general servitudes. In Linvest-
ment, the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned this decision, holding that
there were sufﬁcient reasons for departing from the Gardens Estate position.57
Amongst other reasons,58 the Supreme Court of Appeal relied on a historical
argument for its departure from the Gardens Estate position,59 deciding that
Gardens Estate was founded on the incorrect premise that Voet properly
reﬂects the position in Roman-Dutch law,60 while a draft Civil Code
prepared by Kemper in 1816 indicates that it was indeed possible for the
servient owner to have even a speciﬁed servitude of right of way relocated
unilaterally. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Kemper draft
was an authoritative statement of mature Roman-Dutch law as it should have
been applied in Gardens Estate and consequently it could be relied on as
authority for departure from the earlier decision.61
However, the court’s reliance on the Kemper draft is at least controversial
on historical grounds. The 1816 Kemper draft did not form part of the
received Roman-Dutch law at the Cape, which is traditionally deﬁned as the
laws of Holland as they were in force during Dutch colonisation of the Cape
between 1652 and 1795.62 The claim that the Kemper draft arguably reﬂects
a later and more mature stage of development of Roman-Dutch law than
that which was articulated by Voet does not add anything, since the
Roman-Dutch law that was received at the Cape was not the mature law as it
existed prior to the Dutch codiﬁcation but the law as it was brought to the
Cape and developed there until the ﬁnal decade of the 18th century. Further-
more, the 1816Kemper draft did not ever form part of modern codiﬁedDutch
law either; the ﬁnal Kemper draft of 1820was rejected and the Dutch Burgerlijk
Wetboek of 1838was eventuallymodelled on theCodeCivil.63
My point is not that the Kemper draft could not be used to support the
argument that South African law should move away from the position in
57 Linvestment CC v Hammersley supra note 12 para 13.
58 The court also relied on policy argument and on comparative analysis. For
present purposes I do not consider those grounds for the development, although I
return to the policy argument below. See further Kiewitz op cit note 53 chs 3
(comparative) and 5 (policy).
59 In one sense, the decision strictly speaking does not develop the common law
but relies on a different reading of the common-law position, based on consideration
of different common law authorities. In this respect the decision resembles the
decision in Kidson supra note 13 or the approach of Sonnekus rather than that of Van
derMerwe or Scott.
60 Linvestment CC v Hammersley supra note 12 paras 22–3.
61 Ibid para 24.
62 Kiewitz op cit note 53 at 43–6, citing H R Hahlo & Ellison Kahn The South
African Legal System and its Background (1968) 567; Eduard Fagan ‘Roman-Dutch law
in its SouthAfrican historical context’ in Reinhard Zimmerman & Daniel Visser (eds)
Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 33 at 39.
63 Kiewitz ibid, citing Hahlo & Kahn ibid at 564 and J van Kan ‘Het Burgerlijk
Wetboek en de Code Civil’ in P Scholten & E M Meijers (eds) Gedenkboek Burgerlijk
Wetboek 1838–1938 (1938) 243.
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Garden Estates so as to allow unilateral relocation of a speciﬁed servitude of
right of way. A case for such a development of the common law can be made
on the basis of the comparative and policy considerations the court refers
to,64 and the Kemper draft possibly lends further credence to it. However, on
its own the historical argument is unconvincing because of its very pretence
(but formal lack) of historical authority.
(d) The historical argument for development reconsidered
From the brief analysis above it appears that the decision in Linvestment does
not in fact provide us with what Scott sees in the decision, namely an
example of how the development of the common law should proceed on the
basis of proper historical analysis. First, the decision does not intend to justify
development of the common law, but prefers instead a different reading of
the common law, based on different sources of the common law. Secondly,
the source that the court relies on for this alternative reading of the common
law proves to be at least controversial. The end result is that the decision in
Linvestment in fact resembles exactly the shortcomings for which Scott
criticises the decision in Kidson, namely that it relies on a questionable
historical analysis to justify the conclusion that the common law does not
require development.
From a legal-theoretical perspective, the problem with both Kidson and
Linvestment can be explained with reference to the courts’ approach to what
legal historical analysis can do. In the language of the American Realist and
Critical Legal Studies scholars, historical sources are often too indeterminate
to justify a new development in response to changed circumstances. What
historical sources can do in the face of changed circumstances is to indicate
that a departure from the established position is possible because historical
positions are often only justiﬁed in the conditions in which they originally
developed. This debunking approach65 ﬁts the indeterminate nature of
historical authority66 better than the foundational approach, according to
which we should rely on (what often turns out to be problematic) historical
sources when we want to depart from established positions. On its own,
historical analysis is seldom likely to provide sufﬁcient authority for develop-
ment of the common law in view of changed circumstances. This is arguably
even more true in the constitutional era, where the reasons for change and
development often involve rejection of certain historical processes. Without
arguing for wholesale adoption of the critical historical approach, I would
64 Kiewitz op cit note 53 provides further support for this development, including
further comparative support in ch 3 and policy arguments (including an extensive
Law and Economics analysis) in ch 5.
65 In support of this view G C J J van den Bergh Geleerd Recht: Een Geschiedenis van
de Europese Rechtswetenschap in Vogelvlucht 3 ed (1994) iv cites OliverWendell Holmes,
who said that history is the means by which we measure the power of the past to
impose on us traditions that no longer serve their original purpose. The passage
appears inOWHolmes ‘The path of the law’ (1997) 110 Harvard LR 991 at 1000.
66 SeeRWGordon ‘Critical legal histories’ (1984) 36 Stanford LR 57.
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argue that we can learn from it that the strong suit of historical analysis is
probably to identify the limits of our established common law positions,
whereafter we have to ﬁnd other — policy, but possibly also constitutional
— reasons for departing from those positions and for the direction of
development we select. In my view, as appears from the analysis below,
proper historical analysis is crucial in determining the common-law position
and it may in some instances suggest possible alternatives for further develop-
ment, but it will seldom be sufﬁcient on its own to justify and direct
development of the common law in view of changed circumstances.
For purposes of the remainder of this article I work, for the sake of
argument, on the hypothesis that Kidson was decided on an erroneous
reading of the common law and that the common-law principle is in fact as
Scott describes it, namely that a servitude of habitation is terminated when
the building to which it pertains is destroyed. For the same reason I work on
the assumption that Linvestment was also decided on the basis of an erroneous
reading of the common law and that the common-law principle is in fact the
way that it was formulated in Gardens Estate, namely that the common law
does not provide for unilateral relocation of a speciﬁed servitude of right of
way. At the same time, I assume that there are strong policy, justice or other
reasons for developing the common law in both instances, so as to allow a
continuation of a servitude of habitation in certain cases despite the demoli-
tion of the speciﬁed building, and to allow unilateral relocation of a speciﬁed
servitude of right of way in certain circumstances despite opposition from
one of the parties involved. These working hypotheses allow me to explore
the value of different approaches that support and facilitate these develop-
ments of the common law of servitude.
In the rest of the article I attempt to rectify what I perceive as a
shortcoming in these decisions and in the academic comments on them,
namely the absence of constitutional analysis that could both justify and
structure the argument in favour of (or against) development of the common
law. The purpose of the ﬁrst part of the analysis was to indicate that
development of the common law can often not be justiﬁed simply on the
basis of historical authority, because of controversy about the status or
interpretation of the historical authorities. In my view, one of the implica-
tions of the new constitutional dispensation is that the justiﬁcation and the
structuring of the process of developing the common law must necessarily
come from constitutional law rather than purely from doctrinal or historical
reasoning. I therefore attempt to provide an outline of the kind of constitu-
tional analysis that could provide the justiﬁcation for and the structure of an
argument in favour of (or against) development of the common law. In doing
so I also argue that at least some of the confusion surrounding the two
decisions discussed here results from failure to distinguish between the two
cases and between the very different reasons for developing the common law
in each of them. In the next part I ﬁrst set out the constitutional framework
within which development of the common law should, in my view, be
considered and take place. In the ﬁnal part I suggest a methodology
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according to which the process of deciding upon and implementing a
development of the common law could proceed.
III DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
(a) Introduction
If traditional historical or doctrinal analysis does not provide satisfactory
answers to new questions, as appears from the analysis of Kidson and
Linvestment above, other considerations must play a part in justifying the
development of the common law that might be required. Sometimes the
historical authorities might direct our attention to alternative possibilities, as
Scott has indicated with reference to Kidson.67 Comparative sources tradi-
tionally play a similar role in the development of the common law. In some
cases, economic and other policy considerations play a comparable role in
deciding to develop the common law, just as equity or fairness might be an
important factor in other cases.
I do not wish to discuss these potential sources of authority or inspiration
for development of the common law in detail here, apart from noting two
points from the conclusions of the previous section. First, historical authori-
ties, foreign law, policy considerations and normative principles can only
justify a particular development of the common law to the extent that the
particular kind of analysis has been done properly and thoroughly, according
to its own requirements and traditions.68 To that extent I agree with Scott’s
criticism of Kidson. Secondly, however, even when we apply our minds and
do historical, comparative or policy analysis ‘properly’, such analysis (and
hence the grounds that we put forward for a particular development of the
common law) will often remain controversial. It is only in the rarest cases that
even ‘properly’done historical, comparative or policy analysis would provide
us with simple, uncontroversial solutions to any given dispute.
In the South African context, commentators seem to agree that constitu-
tional analysis has a role to play in developing the common law. However,
as Scott indicates, constitutional analysis should not be triggered by (or
restricted to) a vague sense that the result of common-law adjudication
would be unfair. Furthermore, constitutional analysis cannot mean simply
checking whether a development we favour would be in conﬂict with a
random constitutional provision, nor does it involve vaguely justifying some
fairness-related argument in favour of a particular outcome. In order to
derive constitutional inspiration for or assistance in the development of the
common law, we need to do proper constitutional analysis, just like we have
to do proper historical or comparative or policy analysis to justify whatever
conclusions we derive from those sources. To date, constitutional analysis is
67 Scott op cit note 8 at 163.
68 In the ﬁnal pages of his note, Scott ibid also criticises the Kidson judgment for
inadequate comparative analysis.
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not all that common in property law and particularly in servitude law. To a
certain extent this is therefore uncharted territory. The purpose of this article
is to establish whether there are some signposts that can direct us in
developing the common law of servitude in a ﬁtting and proper manner.
In an area of law like servitude, where the law consists mostly of
uncodiﬁed common law, tradition prescribes that adjudication of any dispute
must start off by determining what the common-law position on a given
point is. I agree with Scott that a serious effort to determine the common-law
position is always necessary as a starting point because even when we
eventually decide to develop the common law, the fairness of the outcome
cannot be justiﬁed by superﬁcial or inaccurate historical work. Development
of the common law has to rely on proper, skilful analysis of the common-law
sources at the outset, because it makes no sense to develop — in other words
change — the common law unless we have determined what the common-
law situation is and concluded that the common-law position is inadequate
for purposes of the dispute at hand. In Kidson, that requirement would have
been fulﬁlled once it was decided, as Van der Merwe and Scott argue, that the
servitude of habitation was terminated when the house was destroyed; an
outcome that nobody found acceptable. In Linvestment, the crucial point
would have been the conclusion, based on historical analysis, that a speciﬁed
servitude of right of way could not be relocated unilaterally; once again an
outcome that was unacceptable. Once historical analysis indicates an out-
come that appears undesirable for policy (Linvestment) or fairness (Kidson)
reasons, the next step is to determine whether the common law can and
should be developed to produce a more acceptable outcome. Technically,
the courts avoided this problem in both Kidson and Linvestment by deciding
that development of the common law was unnecessary because the common
law already allowed for the outcome they wanted; the analysis in the previous
section suggests that the historical authority forwarded in either decision was
insufﬁcient to support that conclusion. Scott would apparently have pre-
ferred a methodology in terms of which it is concluded that the common law
is unsatisfactory and has to be developed, whereafter the Constitution could
play a role in deciding upon the direction of development, but he does not
specify how the second part of the analysis should proceed. I suggest below
that part of the problem in comparing the Linvestment and Kidson decisions is
the failure to distinguish clearly between them, particularly as far as the
constitutional reasons for undertaking development of the common law in
each of them are concerned. My argument boils down to the following three
points: the decision that the common law needs development must start with
proper analysis of the common-law position; the decision whether to develop
the common law must be taken on the basis of proper constitutional analysis,
although policy and other considerations can play a role; and the decision how
to develop the common law must again start with proper constitutional
analysis, although historical, comparative and policy considerations can play a
role.
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(b) The constitutional framework
In my view,69 the starting point for any case that involves the common law
must be constitutional provisions like s 173 (the high courts have the
inherent power to develop the common law) and s 39(2) (when interpreting
legislation or developing the common law the courts must promote the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights). I argue above that develop-
ment of the common law should start with accurate determination of the
common-law position, based on proper historical analysis, followed by a
decision (which could be based on historical, comparative, policy and other
reasons) that the outcome that is indicated by the common law as it stands is
unacceptable. But in fact constitutional analysis is required even earlier,
namely when deciding whether the common law should be consulted at all
in ﬁnding a solution to a particular dispute. The reason for this perhaps
startling statement is that in the constitutional democracy established by the
1996 Constitution, legal analysis of any kind, including interpretation of
legislation and development of the common law in terms of section 39(2),
has to take as its point of departure the supremacy of the Constitution,70
combined with the single-system-of-law principle enunciated by the Consti-
tutional Court in the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers decision.71 According to
these two principles, the law of servitudes is part of the single system of South
African law, which is shaped by the Constitution as the supreme law, which
derives its force from the Constitution, and which is subject to constitutional
control.Within that framework, the ﬁrst step in analysing or solving any legal
dispute of any kind would always be a constitutional one, namely to
determine the relationship between and the relative authority of various
sources of law that might apply to the matter, such as a particular constitu-
tional provision, legislation and the common law.72 In this area, much more
work needs to be done by private law specialists, but in my view legal analysis
should always start at this point, which is very much a constitutional
framework issue because it involves the supremacy of the Constitution,
respect for the democratic legislature, and the constitutional obligation to
promote transformation. In this perspective the Constitution is not a remote
69 Some of my thinking on this issue was worked out in A J van der Walt Property
and Constitution op cit note 1. In the remainder of this article I rely on that work.
70 Section 2 of the Constitution: ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed
by it must be fulﬁlled’. Compare Van der Walt Property and Constitution op cit note 1
ch 2.
71 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association of South Africa supra note 4 para 44: ‘There is only one system of law. It is
shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including the
common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional
control’: compareVan derWalt ibid.
72 For obvious reasons I do not consider other sources such as customary law or
international law here in the context of servitude law, but in a given case they could
just as well also form part of themix.
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source of general sound judgment against which decisions to develop (or not
to develop) the common law are vaguely tested to ensure that they remain
within the ballpark of constitutional legitimacy. Concomitantly, decisions to
develop (or not to develop) the common law are not taken on the basis of
(hopefully sound) technical legal analysis (whether of the historical, compara-
tive or policy kind), ﬁnally to be subjected to a vague process of constitu-
tional quality control. Instead, both the Constitution and the Constitutional
Court prescribe a single, integrated process within which the single legal
system is developed according to relatively clear constitutional principles. To
aid and structure this process, the Constitutional Court has enunciated
certain principles to ensure that the integrated process of constitutionally
inspired legal development starts off with the selection, on the basis of
constitutional principles, of the applicable source of law. This applies even in
servitude cases, when the source of law seems to be quite obvious.
In a series of decisions the Constitutional Court has set out and applied two
principles according to which we should decide which of a competing set of
potential legal sources (constitutional provisions; legislation; the common
law) should apply to a given legal dispute.73 According to the ﬁrst principle, a
litigant who avers that a right protected by the Constitution has been
infringed must rely on legislation speciﬁcally enacted to protect that right and
may not rely on the constitutional provision directly when bringing action to
protect the right.74 For present purposes I ignore this principle because it
concerns the status of legislation, which is not relevant to the area of servitude
this article deals with.75 The second principle is more directly relevant to
73 The subsidiarity principles and their implications for property law in general are
worked out in more detail in Van der Walt ibid. See further A J van der Walt
‘Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reﬂections on the 2007 term’ (2008) 1 Constitu-
tional Court Review 77ff.
74 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC)
paras 51–2; MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) paras
39–40; Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC) paras 59 (Skweyiya J) and 69
(Ngcobo J). The principle has since then been conﬁrmed in Walele v City of Cape
Town & others 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC) paras 29–30; Nokotyana & others v Ekurhuleni
Metropolitan Municipality & others 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC) paras 47–9. See Van der
Walt 2008 Constitutional Court Review op cit note 73 at 100–3; Van der Walt Property
and Constitution op cit note 1 ch 2 section 3.1. The proviso to this ﬁrst principle states
that although a litigant who avers that a right protected by the Constitution has been
infringed may not rely on the constitutional provision to protect the right, she may
rely directly on the constitutional provision when she attacks the legislation for being
unconstitutional or inadequate in protecting the right: South African National Defence
Union v Minister of Defence supra para 52; Minister of Health NO v New Clicks South
Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign & another asAmici Curiae) 2006 (2) SA311
(CC) para 437; Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 (2) SA24 (CC) para 249;
Engelbrecht v Road Accident Fund 2007 (6) SA 96 (CC) para 15. See Van der Walt 2008
Constitutional Court Review op cit at 101, 104 and 115; Van der Walt Property and
Constitution op cit ch 2 section 3.1.
75 This broad statement needs qualiﬁcation. When a direct appeal to a constitu-
tional provision is called for in a servitude case, the relevant constitutional provision
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servitude law: a litigant who avers that a right protected by the Constitution
has been infringed must rely on legislation speciﬁcally enacted to protect that
right, and may not rely on the common law directly when bringing action
to protect the right.76 When there is no legislation to trigger this second
principle, a litigant can rely directly on either the common law or an
applicable constitutional provision.77 For present purposes,78 neither Kidson
nor Linvestment involved legislation of any kind; the applicable legal princi-
ples in both instances are therefore the common law and whatever constitu-
tional provisions may be relevant. In such cases, analysis and development of
the common law can clearly not be restricted to the common law — instead,
on the basis of the supremacy of the Constitution and the single-system-of-
law principle the issue in these cases is to consider the application of the
common-law principles in view of the relevant constitutional provisions.79
(eg the right to equality and non-discrimination in s 9) may have been given effect in
legislation (in this case the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimi-
nationAct 4 of 2000).According to the ﬁrst subsidiarity principle the litigant then has
to appeal to the legislation and not the constitutional provision. In what follows I
assume this qualiﬁcation and do not repeat it.
76 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 (4) SA490 (CC)
para 25; Minister of Health NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd supra note 74 para 96;
Chirwa v Transnet Ltd supra note 74 para 23; Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa
v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation
and Environment, Mpumalanga Province 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) para 37; Walele v City of
Cape Town supra note 74 para 15. See Van der Walt 2008 Constitutional Court Review
op cit note 73 at 103–5; Van der Walt Property and Constitution op cit note 1 ch 2
section 3.1.
77 One could infer a proviso to the second principle to the effect that a litigant who
avers that a right protected by the Constitution has been infringed may rely on the
common law instead of legislation in so far as the legislation was not intended to cover
that particular aspect of the common law; or in fact does not cover that particular
aspect of the common law; and in so far as the common law is not in conﬂict with the
constitutional provision or with the scheme introduced by the legislation; or can be
interpreted or developed to that effect. Furthermore, even when this proviso applies
the common law can presumably only be relied on, in a case where there is applicable
legislation that was otherwise enacted to give effect to a right in the Bill of Rights,
when and in so far as the common law ﬁts in with the broad scheme established by the
legislation and does not conﬂict with that broad legislative scheme or with relevant
constitutional provisions (s 39(3)). See Van der Walt 2008 Constitutional Court Review
op cit note 73 at 115–6; Van der Walt Property and Constitution op cit note 1 ch 2
section 3.1.
78 There are interpretation and application difﬁculties with these principles that
would take the current discussion too far off course — for example how to deal with
pre-1994 legislation that cannot be said to have been enacted to give effect to the Bill
of Rights, or technical legislation that cannot be related to the Bill of Rights in any
meaningful sense. I deal more fully with these issues in Property and Constitution op cit
note 1 ch 2 sections 3.2–3.5. For criticism of the subsidiarity argument see Karl Klare
‘Legal subsidiarity and constitutional rights: A reply to A J van der Walt’ (2008) 1
Constitutional Court Review 129. I respond to some of these criticisms in Property and
Constitution op cit note 1 ch 2 section 4.
79 SeeVan derWalt Property and Constitution op cit note 1 ch 2 section 3.6.
(2013) 130 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL740
In the absence of applicable legislation, the analysis in cases like Kidson and
Linvestment can indeed start off with analysis of the common-law authorities
to determine the common-law position. However, in the constitutional
dispensation this is a conclusion based on constitutional analysis, in terms of
the subsidiarity principles, and not a starting point. Analysis of the common-
law sources is therefore based on the conclusion of constitutional analysis.
As I indicated earlier, I proceed here on the assumption that the common-
law position, established on the basis of proper historical analysis, is that the
common law does not provide for unilateral relocation of a speciﬁed
servitude of right of way (Linvestment) and that a servitude of habitation is
automatically terminated by law when the structure that forms the object of
the right is destroyed (Kidson). In the constitutional context this determina-
tion of the common-law position leads to the next question, namely whether
the outcome predicated on the common-law position is acceptable. This
stage of the analysis requires further constitutional analysis. Once the com-
mon-law position has been established, the decision whether the common
law can be applied as it stands or whether it might require development
cannot be reached purely on the basis of common-law doctrine or policy
considerations. As Scott pointed out with reference to Kidson, this is a
decision that needs to be made on the basis of constitutional argument and
not because of some vague sense of unfairness. Moreover, the decision
cannot be based purely on whether the common law result satisﬁes the
doctrinal coherence or the logic of the common law; it must be informed by
constitutional provisions and considerations in every particular set of facts
and disputes. In short, deciding that the common-law position falls short of
requirements and that it needs to be developed is a constitutional decision
that should be taken on the basis of a properly followed constitutional
methodology.
In my view, having established what the common-law position is and what
its effect would be in the case at hand, the ﬁrst question is whether this
outcome is directly or indirectly in conﬂict with any particular constitutional
provision. In the absence of applicable legislation, the single-system-of-law
principle and the supremacy of the Constitution imply that the constitutional
legitimacy of the outcome indicated by the common law must be established
as a ﬁrst step. Furthermore, referring to the constitutional provisions is
possible in the context of Kidson and Linvestment because it has already been
established that there is no applicable legislation and the ﬁrst subsidiarity
principle therefore does not prevent direct recourse to constitutional provi-
sions. Most signiﬁcantly, this insight points to an important difference
between the two cases: the reasons for the decision to develop the common
law in Kidson and in Linvestment are very different. This is not an insight that
would readily appear from purely common-law analysis, even when it is
augmented by proper comparative and policy analysis.
(c) Distinguishing between Linvestment and Kidson
In Linvestment, determination of the common-law position indicated (as I
assume for the sake of argument) that the common law does not allow for the
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unilateral relocation of a speciﬁed servitude of right of way. The Linvestment
decision can be read as a judicial argument to the effect that development of
the common law is necessary because a desirable outcome, namely allowing
unilateral relocation of such a servitude, is not allowed by rigid application of
the common law. In this instance, the decision to develop the common law
so that unilateral (but judicially controlled) relocation of a speciﬁed servitude
of right of way is possible is triggered by the desire, based on policy grounds
and supported by evidence from foreign law, to render servitude law more
ﬂexible in a modern economy. The policy reasons for effecting this develop-
ment seem convincing and the comparative arguments lend further support
to them.
However, strictly speaking this utilitarian argument in favour of the
development of the common law in Linvestment should not be the starting
point. According to the constitutional framework explained earlier, the ﬁrst
question should have been whether there are any constitutional arguments
either in favour for or against the desired development.As it happens, there is
no provision in the Bill of Rights that directly or indirectly requires this
development; the desire to develop the common law is purely utilitarian.
However, there is no obvious constitutional reason that prohibits developing
the common law in the proposed way either. Leaving the common law as it
was set out in Gardens Estate as it stands or developing it for the sake of greater
ﬂexibility does not have direct implications for non-utilitarian, democratic
constitutional rights like equality, human dignity or freedom of movement.80
The starting point for developing the common law in Linvestment may therefore
be policy considerations according to which the outcome prescribed by the
common-law principle is for some economic or utilitarian reason unacceptable
or suboptimal. There are no constitutional reasons why the (admittedly inefﬁ-
cient) outcome prescribed by the common law has to be changed by develop-
ment of the common law, but neither are there constitutional reasons why the
common law should not be developed for efﬁciency reasons.
Development of the common law for policy or efﬁciency reasons is neither
constitutionally required nor constitutionally prohibited in the Linvestment
case and it is therefore permissible to develop the common law for purely
utilitarian reasons. The role of the Constitution is consequently to ensure,
during a further stage of the analysis, that the changed outcome brought
80 I am aware that there is no formal hierarchy of fundamental rights in the South
African Constitution. However, in A J van der Walt ‘The continued relevance of
servitude’ (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3 I argue that s 25 analysis should probably in
most cases only feature in the ﬁnal stage of the constitutional argument, when the
effects of a development of the common law on property rights are assessed, and not
in the early stage when the desirability of the development is considered, seeing that
utilitarian (policy) considerations in favour or against the development will already
reﬂect the interests of property holders at that point. At the early stage, the focus
should therefore probably fall on non-utilitarian rights that serve a democratic or
liberty-enhancing purpose, such as equality and human dignity. I therefore leave
constitutional arguments based on s 25 out of consideration at this stage.
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about by development of the common law does not infringe upon constitu-
tional rights. During the next stage of analysis, the constitutional focus is not
the rights of the servient landowner who wanted the servitude relocated (her
interests were promoted by the policy considerations that inspired the
development of the common law), but the rights of the servitude beneﬁciary
who might be affected detrimentally by involuntary loss or transfer of rights
brought about by the development of the common law.
By way of summary, constitutional analysis should therefore have featured
in different ways during successive stages of the Linvestment case: (a) in the
ﬁrst phase, constitutional analysis should ensure that the subsidiarity princi-
ples do not kick in (because there is no applicable legislation); which allows
application of the common law and a direct appeal to constitutional rights;
(b) in the second phase, constitutional analysis should ensure that develop-
ment of the common law (that might be desired for policy or fairness reasons)
is neither required nor prohibited by any constitutional provision; and (c) in
the third phase, s 25 analysis should ensure that the property right of the
servitude beneﬁciary is not unconstitutionally infringed by the outcome
resulting from development of the common law, namely allowing unilateral
relocation of the servitude against her will.
In Kidson the situation is very different. The ﬁrst phase analysis looks the
same and has the same outcome as in the Linvestment case, namely that there is
no applicable legislation, that the subsidiarity principles do not kick in, and
that reference to the common law and a direct appeal to constitutional rights
are therefore allowed. The difference between the two cases appears in the
second phase. If we assume that the servitude was terminated by demolition
of the house, rigid application of the common law would result in the
Kidsons being deprived of their right to live on the farm. This outcome is
directly in conﬂict with the s 26(1) right of access to housing, in the sense that
the Kidsons would be deprived of the possibility that they had, in terms of the
registered servitude of habitation, to return to the house on the farm. Rigid
application of the common-law principle would therefore in this case have
s 26 implications and therefore development of the common law has to be
considered in terms of s 39(2) — in this instance, development of the common
law is required by a constitutional rights provision. This constitutional
conclusion, namely that the effect of rigid application of the common-law
principle must be assessed in view of relevant constitutional provisions and
that its apparent conﬂict with s 26(1) necessitates constitutional analysis, is in
my view (and I suggest that Scott would agree) more satisfactory than the
general and vague sense of unease that seemingly inspired the approach in
Kidson. Moreover, it distinguishes the case from the Linvestment example in
the sense that development of the common law is in this instance obligatory
because the outcome prescribed by the common law as it stands directly
offends against a constitutional right.
This initial assessment of the outcome indicated by the common-law
principle merely indicates that constitutional analysis is necessary to decide
whether (and how) the common law needs to be developed. At this point,
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consideration of s 26(1) therefore merely underlines the necessity for consti-
tutional analysis as part of the decision to develop the common law. The
constitutional analysis in the second phase might involve not only s 26 but
also other constitutional provisions, as well as other non-contitutional
sources such as policy or foreign law. Developing the common law and
allowing the Kidsons to rebuild and return to the house on the farm might in
turn have a negative effect on the property rights of the current owner of the
servient land, which would require a s 25 analysis in the third phase, to
determine whether the servient owner’s property rights have been infringed
in an unconstitutional manner. In contrast with Linvestment, constitutional
analysis should therefore feature in all three phases of the decision.
Apart from the fact that the constitutional outcome is different in this case
because development of the common law is constitutionally required, the
starting point, nature and direction of the constitutional analysis would be
different as well. Development of the common law is inevitable in view of
the potential effect that enforcement of the common law might have on s 26
rights, while development of the common law to satisfy the s 26 require-
ments may have further s 25 implications. After the initial phase in which the
sources were identiﬁed, further constitutional analysis is unavoidable in terms
of both s 26 (second phase) and s 25 (third phase). Section 26 analysis in the
second phase would focus on the servitude holder’s rights, while s 25 analysis
in the third phase would focus on the effect that development of the
common law might have on the property rights of the servient owner. The
s 26 part of the analysis, focusing on the rights of the servitude holder, would
indicate whether development of the common law is indeed required and
what it might have to involve (phase two); the s 25 part would ensure that the
development that is introduced does not infringe upon the rights of the
servient owner (phase three).
This part of the article indicates that constitutional analysis should feature
throughout any dispute, even when it involves what looks like a purely
private servitude question based on the common law. In the next section I
sketch out the possible progress of servitude cases that involve development
of the common law.
IV CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
(a) Introduction
As I indicate in the preceding part of this article, adjudication of any legal
dispute should in the constitutional dispensation start of with determining
the applicable sources of law, according to the subsidiarity principles that the
Constitutional Court had enunciated in view of constitutional provisions. In
the case of servitude disputes, this step would mostly involve establishing
whether there is any applicable legislation that falls under the subsidiarity
principles. Given the scarcity of servitude legislation the result would more
often than not be that there is no applicable legislation and that the dispute
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can be adjudicated in terms of the common law of servitude, with the
possibility of a direct resort to constitutional provisions in certain instances.81
As appears from the analysis above, the initial conclusion that the common
law is the applicable source of law is followed by historical analysis to
determine the common-law position. Once that position has been estab-
lished, the next step is to decide whether the outcome prescribed by
application of the common-law principle is acceptable. Constitutional assess-
ment of the outcome prescribed by the common law as it stands is necessary
even when there are strong non-constitutional reasons, such as policy or
other fairness arguments, for or against development of the common law.
This decision will often be informed by policy and other utilitarian consider-
ations, but in the constitutional dispensation the primary question is whether
the outcome is in conﬂict with non-utilitarian, democratic constitutional
provisions. This is so because constitutional arguments for or against devel-
opment of the common law would, in view of the supremacy of the
Constitution, probably trump any utilitarian, non-constitutional consider-
ations that might exist. This could involve any number of constitutional
rights provisions like s 9 (equality and non-discrimination) or s 10 (human
dignity). As soon as there is an indication that a rights provision in the Bill of
Rights might be compromised, this would indicate that a particular develop-
ment of the common law is either constitutionally required or prohibited,
depending on the situation. Doing so has the added advantage that it
distinguishes between cases where the decision to develop the common law
results from doctrinal or policy considerations (like Linvestment) and instances
(like Kidson) where development of the common law is a direct constitu-
tional obligation, regardless of doctrinal or policy arguments for or against
development.
Constitutional reasons for or against development should therefore be
considered as a ﬁrst step. For purposes of the two decisions discussed here
(Kidson and Linvestment) it has already been established that s 26 is the most
relevant provision and therefore I focus on s 26.82
81 See note 75 above.
82 For present purposes I will not indulge in a full s 26 analysis; as a rule it will only
rarely become relevant to the development of servitude law. This point requires
further analysis and argument, but probably ex lege termination of any of the personal
servitudes of habitation will raise more or less the same s 26 issues in cases like Kidson.
Section 26 analysis would probably come into the picture when the outcome
prescribed by a common law principle of servitude law is in direct conﬂict with s 26
rights to the extent that it either deprives someone of their existing access to housing
or allows for arbitrary eviction from someone’s home. When s 26 does become
relevant, there is a sizeable case law and literature (mostly in the area of socio-
economic rights rather than property) to assist development of an argument in
support of development of the common law that would prevent infringements of the
s 26(1) right of access to adequate housing or the s 26(3) right not to be deprived of
one’s home arbitrarily. See eg Sandra Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication
under a Transformative Constitution (2010) ch 6; Gustav Muller The Impact of Section 26
of the Constitution on the Eviction of Squatters in South African Law (LLD dissertation,
Stellenbosch University, 2011) 75–93 and sources cited there. The aspect of the
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(b) Section 26
It appears from the analysis above that the development in Linvestment is
based purely on utilitarian grounds; there is no constitutional provision that
either requires or prohibits such a development, but there are strong policy
reasons for it. Having established the absence of constitutional and the
strength of other reasons for the development, the court could therefore
proceed directly to implementation of the development it has in mind. That
would bypass the constitutional analysis that is at stake here, namely to
determine whether a constitutional provision requires the development and
what it should entail.
In Kidson the enforcement of the common-law principle, namely the ex
lege termination of the servitude upon destruction of the building, allows the
landowner to resist the rebuilding of the building and the continuation of the
habitation right. This outcome is prima facie in conﬂict with the negative
obligation imposed by the right of access to housing in s 26(1) because it
implies that the former holder of the right of habitation would lose her
existing access to housing. Since this outcome is prima facie in conﬂict with
the negative obligation in s 26(1) it requires further analysis to establish
whether the apparent limitation of the s 26(1) right could be justiﬁed or
rectiﬁed.According to the emerging jurisprudence on this point, this analysis
assumes the form of a weighing up of the access to housing interests of the
affected persons and the property rights of the landowner to establish what
the effect on the former inhabitant would be if the right is terminated, and
what the effect on the landowner would be if it is not terminated, in both
cases taking into consideration the historical, social and individual context.
Additionally, infringements against access to housing rights and legal rules
that bring about homelessness always also involve the s 10 right to human
dignity.83
s 26(1) right that would most often be relevant to this kind of property issue is the
so-called negative obligation embodied in s 26, which refers to the obligation
(potentially affecting both the state and private individuals) not to deprive a person of
the access to housing that he or she currently enjoys. This issue therefore comes up as
soon as the enforcement of a common law rule involves someone losing their current
home. Muller ibid works out the detail of the negative obligation implied in s 26 at
93–9 and refers to themost important sources.
83 See Liebenberg op cit note 82 ch 6; Muller op cit note 82 at 75–93 and sources
cited there. The most important cases cited by Muller are Government of the Republic of
South Africa & others v Grootboom & others 2001 (1) SA46 (CC) paras 23 and 83; Jaftha v
Schoeman & others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz & others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) para 29; Port
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 12, 15, 18 and
41–2; Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v
City of Johannesburg & others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 16; Residents of Joe Slovo
Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) paras 75, 119,
173, 218, 231, 329 and 406; Machele & others v Mailula & others 2010 (2) SA 257 (CC)
para 29. See also Arthur Chaskalson ‘Human dignity as a foundational value of our
constitutional order’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 193; Albie Sachs ‘The judicial enforcement
of socio-economic rights’ (2003) 56 Current Legal Problems 579; and Sandra Lieben-
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Of particular importance for property law is the leading judgment on s 26,
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers, where the Constitutional Court
sets out its perspective on the balancing of property (s 25) and housing (s 26)
interests, explaining that ‘the judicial function in these circumstances is not to
establish a hierarchical arrangement between the different interests involved’
but ‘to balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as
possible’.84 The protection enjoyed by a particular individual right or interest
is determined in a speciﬁc context, varying with the respective weight of two
considerations, namely how important upholding the established right is for
the individual holder and how important regulating and limiting that right is
for the public interest in exercising a legitimate state function such as
preventing homelessness. The Port Elizabeth Municipality decision indicates
that the s 26(1) access to housing interest of even unlawful occupiers, who
enjoy no rights in terms of the common law, is relevant to the weighing up
process involved in s 26 analysis. On the continuum that represents the
tension between the interests of the parties, the rights of landowners will
sometimes trump the access to housing interests of others, while the opposite
may occur under particular conditions. Importantly, the decision indicates
that the weighing up of interests cannot take place in the customary hierarchy
of private-law rights, where it is abstractly determined that stronger rights
always trump weaker rights and all rights always trump no-rights. Instead, a
contextual assessment of all rights and interests is required in view of the
contextual and legislative matrix within which housing rights and obligations
are regulated under the guidance of s 26 and the rest of the Bill of Rights.
In a case like Kidson, a s 26(1) analysis will therefore involve weighing the
property interest of the landowner against the access to housing interest of
the Kidsons, taking into account all the relevant contextual factors. In this
regard, the relevant factors might include the fact that a development of the
common law that would make a servitude of habitation survive demolition
of the structure would generally not have a huge impact on the servient
landowner because of the limited lifespan of personal servitudes; the limited
effect that a servitude of habitation usually has on the right of the landowner,
especially given the principles of servitude;85 the fact that servitudes of
habitation are often reserved upon sale and transfer of the land, indicating a
strong bond between the right holder and the servient land; and the
importance of the servitude for the right holder’s access to housing and the
effect that termination would have on her in the individual case.86 Against
berg ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ (2005) 21
SAJHR 1.
84 Supra note 83 para 23; see the text below.
85 Principles such as passivity and exercise of the servitude civiliter modo are
relevant here; seeVan derMerwe Sakereg op cit note 3 at 466–7.
86 In this regard it is noteworthy that the rights of the elderly and the negative
effect on them of eviction from their home is taken particularly seriously by the courts
when considering the signiﬁcance of availability of alternative accommodation in
view of s 26; seeMuller op cit note 82 at 288–91.
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that might weigh any evidence that the servient landowner might present
regarding the negative effect that upholding the servitude would have on her,
for instance in negatively affecting a business operation or her own housing
rights or privacy. In Kidson, the fact that the house had been demolished and
that the Kidsons were not living there when the current owner bought the
land might weigh in the landowner’s favour, although the existence of a
servitude is obviously not dependent upon the servient landowner’s know-
ledge of the existence of the servitude.On the other hand, the Kidsons’age and
personal circumstances and the context in which they initially left the farm
might favour upholding the servitude. If the outcome of the analysis indicates
that application of the common law principle results in an infringement of s 26
rights, the court would have to decide whether that infringement is justiﬁed in
terms of s 36.87
For present purposes, the outcome of the s 26 analysis in a case like Kidson
would be to determine whether a development of the common law is indeed
required and, if so, what the development should involve. If a rigid applica-
tion of the common-law principle would result in someone losing his or her
right of access to housing and becoming homeless, and if that limitation of
the affected person’s s 26(1) right cannot be justiﬁed in terms of section 36,
the common law has to be developed to avoid that outcome. In Kidson the
court and the academic commentators thought that there was good reason to
assist the Kidsons, although they favoured different solutions. This decision
will depend on the facts and context of each individual case and is therefore
difﬁcult to discuss abstractly,88 but I assume that most courts would, having
done s 26 analysis, conclude that a limitation of s 26 rights implied by strict
application of the common-law principle regarding termination of a right of
habitation through demolition of the structure is not justiﬁed and that it is
necessary to develop the common law so as to allow for a more ﬂexible
outcome in hard cases.
Once it has been decided that development of the common law is
necessary there are various alternatives. The outcome of the common law
could be changed by making new legislation or amending existing legisla-
tion, but for present purposes I am more interested in judicial development
of the common law by amending the existing principle or adopting a
different principle. Strictly speaking, Kidson does not provide us with an
example of such a development because the court accepted that the common
law authorised the outcome it wanted. Van der Merwe’s proposal of recogn-
87 I do not go into the detail of justiﬁcation analysis here. This form of analysis is
very case speciﬁc and the reasonableness aproach followed by the courts might imply
that s 36 can add or change very little to what has been decided under s 26: see
Liebenberg op cit note 82 at 94–7.
88 It is conceivable in a particular set of facts that the servitude holder would not be
deprived of his or her access to housing if the servitude is terminated. An example
might be if he or she also has another house and uses the servitude property just for
holiday accommodation, or not at all, while rebuilding of the house and resumption
of the right of habitationmight cause a heavy burden on the servient owner.
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ising a hitherto unknown exception to the rule from a non-authoritative
source is an example of what such a development of the common law might
entail: although the local law of Haarlem upon which Van der Merwe relies
does not form part of the South African Roman-Dutch sources, there is no
reason why such an extraneous source could not have convincing authority
for adoption of a new or amended rule. Scott’s solution — development by
way of adopting a different rule according to which the servitude could
revive when the structure is rebuilt — might even be stronger authority for
the desired development. Another possibility might be to create, through
judicial action, a new rule or an exception to the existing rule on the basis of
subsequent statutory development in other Roman-Germanic based legal
systems. As far as judicial development is concerned, most courts would
probably favour a ﬂexible development that would allow for exceptions to
the common-law rule in some cases without abandoning it completely. For
the same reason I assume that application of the exception adopted by way of
development should require exercise of the judicial discretion.
In either case, if the common law is developed judicially to avoid conﬂict
with s 26, the relevant development might involve an infringement of the
servient landowner’s s 25 rights, which would then require s 25 analysis
during the third phase. The same applies to a development that was
undertaken on purely utilitarian grounds, as in Linvestment; the development
that the court decided on favours the servient owner and might affect the
dominant owner’s property rights.
(c) Section 25: The starting point
If s 25 analysis is indicated, the question is whether there was an interference
with property that might be in conﬂict with s 25. As is indicated above, such
an indication might appear from the policy decision to allow unilateral
relocation of a speciﬁed right of way (Linvestment), because the relocation
might affect the dominant owner’s property interest in the servitude; or it
might appear from the constitutional decision to amend the common-law
principle according to which demolition of a structure terminates a right of
habitation (Kidson), with the result that the servient owner’s property right is
affected.
According to the methodology for deciding s 25 disputes that was laid
down in the FNB decision,89 s 25 analysis should proceed on the basis of
seven questions, which are as follows:90 (a) Is there a protected property
interest involved? (b) If there was property, was there a deprivation of that
89 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue
Service & another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002
(4) SA 768 (CC) (‘the FNB case’). For a general discussion see A J van der Walt
Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) 194ff.
90 The clearest explanation of the seven steps is that of Theunis Roux ‘Property’
in Stu Woolman, Theunis Roux & Michael Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South
Africa vol 3 2 ed (Original Service 2003) 46-2 to 46-5, and 46-9 to 46-11.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW OF SERVITUDE 749
property? (c) If there was a deprivation, was the deprivation arbitrary? (d) If
the deprivation was arbitrary, can it be justiﬁed in terms of section 36(1)? (If
the arbitrary deprivation cannot be justiﬁed, it is unconstitutional and that
ends the constitutional inquiry.) (e) If the deprivation was not arbitrary or if it
could be justiﬁed in terms of s 36(1), does it also constitute expropriation? (f)
If the deprivation does constitute expropriation, does it comply with the
requirements in s 25(2)? (f) If the expropriation does not comply with the
s 25(2) requirements, can it be justiﬁed in terms of s 36(1)? If the expropria-
tion does not comply and cannot be justiﬁed, it is unconstitutional.
According to this methodology, the ﬁrst questions are whether there was a
protected property interest involved91 and whether there was a deprivation
of that property. In the FNB decision92 the Constitutional Court indicated
that ‘deprivation’ is a wide category of interferences with property that
includes but extends beyond the narrower category of expropriation.93 The
major constitutional property cases to date dealt with statutory deprivations
and therefore it has remained somewhat difﬁcult to identify and describe
accurately the property interest and the deprivation involved in a particular
dispute where the applicable legal principles derive purely from the common
law. I ﬁnd it helpful to frame this question about the starting point in
common law cases in the terminology of Law and Economics, by resorting to
the language of initial allocation and forced transfer of entitlements. As far as
servitude law is concerned, this means translating any given dispute in terms
of the question whether the enforcement (or non-enforcement) of any given
servitude principle or rule involves a forced transfer of a particular entitle-
ment. Obvious examples are common-law principles that prescribe compul-
sory, unilateral creation, or alteration, or transfer, or termination of a
servitude, either by way of judicial order (eg creation of a servitude of right of
way of necessity through acquisitive prescription) or ex lege (eg termination
91 The deﬁnition of ‘property’ for purposes of s 25 is a broad topic, especially
insofar as common law property interests are concerned. See Van der Walt Constitu-
tional Property Law op cit note 89 ch 3.7 and 3.8. I will not enter upon that issue here,
except to note that it is clear that constitutional property extends beyond corporeal
things and real rights.
92 The FNB case supra note 89. For a general discussion see Van der Walt
Constitutional Property Law ibid at 194ff.
93 The FNB case ibid para 57; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law ibid at
204. The wide deﬁnition of deprivation was apparently narrowed down in Mkon-
twana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality & another; Bissett & others v Buffalo
City Municipality & others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign & others v MEC for Local
Government & Housing in the Province of Gauteng & others 2005 (1) SA530 (CC) para 32,
apparently followed in Reflect-All 1025 CC & others v Member of the Executive Council
for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government & another 2009 (6)
SA 391 (CC) para 36 and Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd & another v Coega Development
Corporation (Pty) Ltd & others 2011 (1) SA293 (CC) para 39. The resulting confusion is
signiﬁcant but not all that relevant for present purposes and therefore I ignore it and
proceed on the basis of the original FNB deﬁnition. See Van der Walt Constitutional
Property Law ibid at 204–9 for a broad discussion.
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of a personal servitude upon death of the beneﬁciary). Framing common-law
property disputes, including servitude disputes, in this manner makes it easier
to identify and describe the property involved and the source and nature
of the deprivation. Both Kidson and Linvestment involved forced transfer of
property rights to the extent that the development of the common law
principles involved requires ex lege, non-consensual extension (Kidson) or
amendment (Linvestment) of existing servitude entitlements. A decision to
leave the common law as it stands will sometimes involve a forced transfer of
rights (eg acquisitive prescription) in any event and sometimes not (eg if the
decision in Linvestment was not to change the rule). However, a decision to
develop the common law will always involve a forced transfer of rights in the
sense that the original allocation sanctioned by the standing common law is
changed.
(d) Section 25: The property and deprivation issues
The s 25 argument might run as follows for the Kidson decision. If the
common-law principle determines that a servitude of habitation is termi-
nated ex lege when the building is demolished, the common law regarding a
servitude of habitation assigns the initial entitlement to the servitude holder
in terms of the contract that created the servitude and subsequent registra-
tion. However, upon demolition of the structure the common law assigns
the initial entitlement to the landowner, whose right is then assumed free of
the servitude burden. One could also argue that the common law brings
about a forced transfer of entitlement from the servitude holder to the
landowner upon the occurrence of a certain event (demolition of the
structure). On the basis of the preceding s 26 analysis we already established
that such an assignment or transfer might be unconstitutional in certain
circumstances and that the common law therefore needs to be developed to
allow for it not to be enforced, at least under certain circumstances. The need
to develop the common law therefore comes up as a result of s 26 analysis that
proved that the common-law principle was inadequate, at least in certain
instances where the hardship it causes is unjustiﬁable in view of s 26.
If the common law is developed so that the common-law principle can be
applied ﬂexibly, and if the holder of the servitude is allowed in a particular
instance to rebuild the house and resume the right of habitation, we can say
that another forced transfer of property takes place. In the Kidson set of facts
we could say that the ﬂexible application of the newly developed common-
law principle results in property (disposal over the right of habitation) being
transferred back from the servient landowner (where the common law
allocated it upon demolition) to the servitude holder. In the common law the
property interest in question could be described as the servient owner’s right,
in terms of the general common-law principle, to have the servitude
terminated ex lege upon demolition of the house and to have her right of
ownership resume its original unburdened state. The deprivation that takes
place as a result of the forced transfer that follows from development of that
principle can be described as the imposition of an ex lege real burden on the
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servient land, in the form of continuation of the servitude, under circum-
stances where it would otherwise have terminated. In terms of the FNB
decision, the forced transfer (through development of the common law) of
this property interest from the servient landowner to the servitude holder
constitutes a deprivation of property that needs to comply with s 25.
In Linvestment, the common-law principle determines that it is not possible
unilaterally to relocate a speciﬁed servitude of right of way. In this case the
common-law principle as it stands does not bring about a unilateral, forced
transfer of entitlements; it merely assigns the entitlement where the origin of
the servitude located it, namely in mutual agreement. In this case the analysis
starts off with the need, identiﬁed on the basis of policy considerations, to
change or develop the common-law principle so as to make it possible to
relocate a speciﬁed servitude of right of way under certain circumstances,
even when the dominant owner refuses to co-operate. Having identiﬁed the
need to develop the common law, the constitutional inquiry focuses on the
question whether the proposed change will comply with the relevant
constitutional requirements. If the proposed development of the common
law is the starting point, the affected property interest can be described as the
dominant landowner’s right to use the speciﬁed right of way as it was
originally speciﬁed and registered and to refuse to have that right relocated
without consensus. Similarly, the deprivation can be described as the loss,
through unilateral judicial relocation of the servitude, of the dominant
owner’s right not to have the servitude amended without her consent. A
forced transfer of the property interest involved from the sphere of mutual
consent into the hands of the servient landowner qualiﬁes as a deprivation of
property that needs to comply with the s 25 requirements.
It can therefore be concluded that development of the common law in
both Kidson and Linvestment involved forced transfers of property interests
that can be described as deprivations of property. Both cases therefore answer
the initial two questions in the FNB methodology in the afﬁrmative. The
next, and according to all indications most signiﬁcant, question in each case is
whether the deprivation in question was arbitrary.
(e) Section 25: Arbitrariness
The major question in s 25 analysis is whether the deprivation is arbitrary.94
In FNB the Constitutional Court explains that a deprivation is arbitrary in
94 The methodological analysis of the seven steps in the FNB decision simply
focuses on the arbitrariness issue and therefore does not mention the preceding
question, also based on s 25(1), whether the deprivation was properly authorised by
law of general application. In the servitude cases we are dealing with this question
should not cause any major issues since the relevant deprivations would always be
authorised by the common law, which is regarded as law of general application for
purposes of s 25: Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law op cit note 89 at 234 and
sources cited there.
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terms of s 25(1) if it is procedurally unfair95 or, substantively, if there is
insufﬁcient reason for it, judging from a complexity of contextual relation-
ships.96 In FNB the court identiﬁes the relationship between the means
employed and the ends sought to be achieved; the relationship between the
affected property holder and the property; the connection between the
affected property holder and the reason for the deprivation; the extent of the
deprivation; and the nature of the affected property as factors to be consid-
ered in this respect.
In Kidson, s 25 analysis would therefore consider the relationship between
the Kidsons and the reason for the deprivation (protecting the access to
housing rights of especially vulnerable persons); the relationship between the
Kidsons and the servitude (a right they reserved for themselves when selling
the land, which they have never willingly abandoned or given up, and which
now seems to be their only access to housing); the nature of the property (the
landowner’s right to enjoy unburdened, full ownership when a servitude is
extinguised ex lege); and the extent of the deprivation (the landowner’s
ownership continues to be burdened by a servitude that will end in a
reasonable short time and that probably does not impose an extensive
limitation on it). The analysis would also consider the relationship between
the ends sought to be achieved by the original common-law principle
(protecting the landowner’s right of ownership and promoting legal cer-
tainty) and the means employed to promote those ends (ex lege terminating
the servitude upon destruction of the building). With regard to the latter
factor it needs to be kept in mind that the more or less reﬂex tendency of the
common law to uphold the interests of the owner above any other right in
the same property is part of what might be described as the traditional
hierarchical approach to the legal force of competing property interests;
according to Port Elizabeth Municipality97 it is now incumbent on courts not
to follow this doctrinal reﬂex but to judge property disputes more contextu-
ally in view of all the circumstances and the relevant constitutional provi-
sions.
According to the FNB decision, this complexity of relationships has to be
considered, in the context of all the relevant circumstances, to decide
95 The FNB case supra note 89 para 100. Neither the FNB decision nor
subsequent decisions following it explain what procedural arbitrariness entails. In
earlier publications I have argued that this category can logically only refer to
deprivation brought about directly by legislation and not involving any administra-
tive action: see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law op cit note 89 at 264–70;
A J van derWalt ‘Procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property’ (2012) 23 Stellenbosch
LR 88.Assuming the correctness of that observation I conclude that the category does
not apply to deprivations brought about by the common law and thus ignore it for
present purposes.
96 The FNB case para 100; see further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law op
cit note 89 at 245–64 and sources cited there.
97 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers supra note 83 para 23. See the
previous part of this article above.
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whether there is sufﬁcient reason for the deprivation, in other words for the
forced transfer of property (in the form of the right to own land unburdened
by a servitude) from the landowner to the Kidsons (who acquire the right of
continued enjoyment of the servitude, which in turn again burdens the land).
The question is whether there is sufﬁcient reason, judging on the basis of the
constitutional provisions involved, the historical and social context and all
other circumstances, to take the right to own land free of a servitude from the
owner and transfer that right to the Kidsons in the form of continuation of
the servitude even after demolition of the house, allowing them to rebuild
the house and continue living there according to the original conditions of
the servitude. Contextual factors that might add texture to this analysis
include the restricted lifetime of personal servitudes, the age of the Kidsons
and the length of time for which upholding their servitude would presum-
ably still burden the landowner’s right, the circumstances under which they
were initially forced from the farm and under which the house was
destroyed, their chances of ﬁnding alternative accommodation, and other
relevant considerations. Considered together, these indicators would proba-
bly justify the conclusion that the deprivation of the servient owner’s right to
own the land free of the servitude was justiﬁed by the reasons for continuing
the servitude and that it was therefore not arbitrary, especially if the amend-
ment of the common-law principle is brought about by way of ﬂexible
exception that is applied only when a court decides that it is justiﬁed in the
circumstances of a particular case. This conclusion ﬁnds some support in the
general agreement that it would have been harsh and unfair to leave the
Kidsons homeless under the circumstances. However, a conclusion in favour
of the development of the common law implied by the decision in Kidson
requires a full and proper s 25 analysis that includes consideration and
weighing up of the factors enumerated above; a vague sense of dissatisfaction
with the effect of strict enforcement of the common-law principle is just as
unsatisfactory as a reading that would seem to make the desired result possible
without development of the common law, despite what appears to be strong
contrary indications from the common law sources. In the end result, the
proper explanation of Kidson seems to be (1) application of the common law
is justiﬁed because the subsidiarity principles do not kick in; (2) analysis of the
common law suggests that strict enforcement of the common-law principle
would lead to a result that is in direct conﬂict with an explicit constitutional
obligation, which means that development of the common law must be
investigated; (3) development of the common law to avoid the unconstitu-
tional result seems to be possible in the form of development of an exception
to the general principle on the basis of other, related common-law principles;
(4) this development of the common law brings about a deprivation of the
landowner’s property for purposes of s 25(1), but the deprivation is not
necessarily arbitrary, depending on the outcome of the judical weighing of
competing interests that is required by the FNB judgment.
In Linvestment, the deprivation involves taking away the dominant owner’s
right to veto relocation of the right of way. To decide whether there is
(2013) 130 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL754
sufﬁcient reason for that deprivation the court considers the same set of
factors and relationships that are set out above. In this case, the policy reasons
for bringing about the development that would allow relocation would be
weighed against the impact that the deprivation might have on the affected
dominant owner. Probably the most signiﬁcant factor would be the fact that
the relocation, as it was foreseen in the judicial development of the common
law applied in Linvestment, can only take place upon application by the
servient owner and ordered by the court, having considered all the relevant
circumstances. That in itself should preclude any possibility of the depriva-
tion being arbitrary, since a judicial decision based on the exercise of a valid
judicial discretion in view of all the circumstances should by deﬁnition not be
arbitrary as that term was deﬁned in FNB.98 The decision in Linvestment, and
especially the way in which the court ensured that the relocation is only
allowed if it causes no material hardship or loss for the dominant owner but
protects a signiﬁcant interest of the servient owner, underlines the logical
force of this conclusion. The result is therefore again that the deprivation
brought about by the development of the common law in Linvestment is not
arbitrary.
( f ) Relevance of ss 36(1) (justification) and 25(2) (expropriation)
In terms of the FNB methodology, once it has been decided that there was an
arbitrary deprivation of protected property, the next step is to determine
whether the deprivation could be justiﬁed in terms of s 36(1). However, it is
highly unlikely that a deprivation that has been found to be arbitrary could be
justiﬁed in terms of s 36 and therefore I would suggest that this step is
irrelevant for property disputes, especially if the issue is development of the
common law.99
Furthermore, I would also suggest that the rest of the FNB steps involving
expropriation are always irrelevant for property cases involving the applica-
tion or development of common-law principles. Gildenhuys (writing prior
to the FNB decision) has suggested that some forced transfers brought
about by the common law might amount to expropriation,100 but there is no
common-law authority for expropriation in South African law101 and hence
the expropriation part of the FNB test is redundant for deprivations brought
about by common law principles. If a deprivation brought about by a
common-law principle is not arbitrary that is the end of the matter; there is
no need to ask whether it could be an expropriation.
98 I do not argue the point here but would suggest, quite generally, that any
deprivation brought about by a development of the common law that involves a
forced transfer of rights ﬂowing from the exercise of a judicial discretion should not
be arbitrary in terms of s 25(1) and the FNB test.
99 The argument is purely based on logic; see Van der Walt Constitutional Property
Law op cit note 89 at 77, with other sources cited there.
100 Antonie Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 2 ed (2001) 56–7.
101 See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law op cit note 89 at 346 and 453 for
references to authority.
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(g) Section 25: Conclusion
If the s 25(1) analysis of forced transfers brought about by development of the
common law terminates with the arbitrariness test, deprivations of this kind
will logically speaking always be either not arbitrary and therefore constitu-
tionally unassailable or they will be substantively arbitrary, not justiﬁable and
thus unconstitutional. In cases where the deprivation is arbitrary and there-
fore unconstitutional, the next step is to determine the correct remedy,
which will sometimes involve a decision as to whether the common law can
and should be developed differently, perhaps more radically by way of
legislation, so as to ensure either avoidance of the arbitrary result or compen-
sation in some form.
V CONCLUSION
Most commentators would probably agree that the outcomes in Linvestment
and Kidson were justiﬁed and fair. Not all commentators agree that those
outcomes were made possible by the development of the common law, but
those who do agree would probably also agree that the developments in
question were necessary and justiﬁed. As the analysis of academic comments
on Kidson indicates, there nevertheless remains a measure of discomfort and
dissatisfaction about the reasoning that surrounds this decision. This article is
intended to show that the discomfort and dissatisfaction are caused by lack of
a proper normative framework within which decisions about development
of the common law can be taken. The main point put forward in the article is
that such a normative framework is not only necessary, but that it is inevitably
constitutional in nature. The article is meant to show that a constitutionally
inspired normative framework makes it easier to decide on a principled basis
when, why and how development of the common law should take place,
even in seemingly innocuous and purely private areas of the common law
such as the law of servitudes. The role of the Constitution in this regard is
threefold: constitutional principles should ﬁrst indicate whether the common
law is indeed the applicable source of law for a particular problem; secondly,
having determined that the common law is the applicable source of law and
having established what the common-law position is, constitutional analysis
should indicate whether there are constitutional provisions that either
require or proscribe a particular development of the common law as it stands;
and thirdly, having developed the common law on constitutional or other,
utilitarian grounds, further constitutional analysis should indicate whether
the development in question causes limitations of property rights that require
section 25 scrutiny.A point that is relied on but not argued extensively in this
article is that a s 25 analysis mostly features in the third of these stages,
whereas general constitutional provisions dominate the ﬁrst, and Bill of
Rights provisions that secure non-utilitarian democratic constitutional rights
like equality feature in the second.
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